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The Protection of Performers under U.S. Law in 
Comparative Perspective
Daniel Gervais, Ph.D.*
Iඇඍඋඈൽඎർඍංඈඇ
The majority opinion of the Ninth Circuit panel in Garcia v. Google, Inc.1 stands for the 
proposition that an actor has copyright in her performance. The case was described as hor-
rific and generated a significant amount of traffic on LISTSERVs and social media.  2 
In the opinion, Chief Judge Kozinski made three key points. First, that there was original-
ity in the performance, as required under Feist 3. The Feist court found that creative choices 
were necessary to generate sufficient originality to warrant copyright protection. Using 
Feist as backdrop, the Garcia majority found that:
An actor’s performance, when fi xed, is copyrightable if it evinces “some mini-
mal degree of creativity . . . ‘no matter how crude, humble or obvious’ it might 
be.” Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., . . . . That is true whether the 
actor speaks, is dubbed over or, like Buster Keaton, performs without any 
words at all.  4
Second, Chief Justice Kozinski found that a performance could be a derivative work of the 
script, noting that an unauthorized derivative received no copyright protection.5
Third, he dismissed what might seem like a Coasean argument on the impossibly high 
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School; Director, Vanderbilt University Intellec-
tual Property Program.
1.  743 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 2014). An en banc review was pending as of this writing.
2.  Mike Masnick, Horrific Appeals Court Ruling Says Actress Has Copyright Interest in ‘In-
nocence Of Muslims,’ Orders YouTube to Delete Every Copy, TൾർඁDංඋඍ, Feb. 26, 2014, available 
at https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140226/12103626359/horrific-appeals-court-ruling-says-
actress-has-copyright-interest-innocence-muslims-orders-youtube-to-delete-every-copy.shtml.
3.  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). For a discussion see Daniel J. 
Gervais, Feist Goes Global: A Comparative Analysis of the Notion of Originality in Copyright Law, 
49:4 J. Cඈඉඒඋං඀ඁඍ. Sඈർ’ඒ Oൿ Tඁൾ U.S.A. 949, 951-54 (2001-2002).
4.  Garcia, 743 F.3d at 1263 (first omission in original and second omission added).
5.  Id. at 1264 (“Where, as here, an actor’s performance is based on a script, the performance 
is likewise derivative of the script, such that the actor might be considered to have infringed the 
screenwriter’s copyright.”).
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transaction costs if a thicket of copyrights were recognized in film because:
As the above discussion makes clear, any analysis of the rights that might at-
tach to the numerous creative contributions that make up a fi lm can quickly 
become entangled in an impenetrable thicket of copyright. But it rarely comes 
to that because copyright interests in the vast majority of fi lms are covered by 
contract, the work for hire doctrine or implied licenses.6
The dissent also makes interesting points, in particular in drawing a clear distinction be-
tween a performance and a work in a copyright context—a distinction which, the dissent 
opines, is solidly anchored in the text of the statute: 
Section 101 of the Act is also instructive, because it diff erentiates a work from 
the performance of it. It defi nes “perform a ‘work’” to mean “to recite, render, 
play, dance or act it.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). Given this provi-
sion, it is diffi  cult to understand how Congress intended to extend copyright 
protection to this acting performance. . . . An acting performance resembles 
the “procedure” or “process” by which “an original work” is performed. . . . 
Therefore, “[i]n no case does copyright protection” extend to an acting perfor-
mance, “regardless of the form in which it is described, illustrated, or embod-
ied in” the original work.7
Wherever this case ends up in the courts, it raises fundamental questions about US law as 
it applies to performed works. This Essay uses a comparative lens to shed some hopefully 
useful light on the debate. The Essay proceeds essentially in two parts. First, the Essay ex-
plores and critiques the international protection of performers’ rights using both history and 
policy as focal points. The following part describes the protection of performers and other 
owners of “related rights” in US law and explains the differences that adopting a related 
rights regime would bring about in the United States.
II. Tඁൾ Iඇඍൾඋඇൺඍංඈඇൺඅ Pඋඈඍൾർඍංඈඇ ඈൿ Pൾඋൿඈඋආൾඋඌ
A. Are Performances Works?
The dissent in Garcia is correct of course in pointing out that the Copyright Act draws 
a distinction between works and performances.8 That is not dispositive, however. It is not 
because a performance is a performance that it then cannot also be a work. 
6.  Id. at 1265. 
7.  Id. at 1270 (Smith, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (omissions added).
8.  See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“work” and “perform”). The statute uses the term “performance” else-
where, such as in 17 U.S.C. § 110, and apparently to mean something other than “work” because it 
refers to “performance(s) of a work.” 
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Actors can (and usually do) make what one might describe in everyday language as creative con-
tributions to audiovisual productions such as a motion pictures.9 This might lead to the suggestion 
that actors should be protected against some unauthorized uses of their creative contributions. In 
copyright terms, actors arguably make “creative choices,” the common test for originality in many 
countries and the Berne Convention, though there are variations in its application.10
A similar analysis applies to music. Is Yehudi Menuhin’s version of J.S. Bach’s sonatas 
or Brahms’ violin concerto in D minor op. 77 not “creative”? Does it not exhibit “creative 
choices”? To quote Eric Taver:
It is of course in the 1949 recording with the Lucerne Festival Orchestra [of 
the above-mentioned Brahms Concerto] that one must listen to Menuhin 
throw himself at the notes while taking every imaginable risk. It is here that 
the Menuhin we will later come to know shows his colors, the Menuhin whose 
left hand climbs into the stratosphere while pulling at each note, catching it at 
the end of a fi nger and vibrating it to limit the risk of going astray. Menuhin is 
establishing his own style, a lively sound snatched from the string ….11
Professor Adrian Sterling offers an interesting analysis of this fact pattern. He suggested 
that when Rubinstein plays Beethoven, he “sees the printed notes and plays accordingly.”12 
“Beethoven,” he adds, “is certainly the author of the work as set down in the printed notes. 
Is Rubinstein the author of the particular presentation of the collection of sounds, so that his 
performance constitutes a work in its own right?”13 He then suggests that many nationali-
ties have decided against protecting only some performances (those that bring an original or 
creative contribution to the performance) and opted to protect all, thus cutting the “Gordian 
9.  ***________________***
10.  See Elizabeth F. Judge & Daniel Gervais, Of Silos and Constellations: Comparing Notions 
of Originality in Copyright Law, 27:2 Cൺඋൽඈඓඈ Aඋඍඌ & Eඇඍ. L. J. 375, 404 (2009) (“Although the 
wording of the [different originality] standards [in various jurisdictions] might suggest that the 
results would frequently diverge—industriousness would seem on its face to be much more lenient 
than intellectual creation or creativity—the judicial application of the standards has narrowed the 
gap by insisting on a sufficient degree of skill and labor, on one end, and accepting a very low 
degree of creativity, on the other. As the U.S. Supreme Court took pains to clarify with respect to 
Feist, “the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. The vast 
majority of works make the grade quite easily[.]”)
11.  Eric Taver, Yehudi Menuhin (1916-1999): Three stages in the Life of a Violinist, Cඎඅඍඎඋൾ 
Kංඈඌඊඎൾ (May 7, 1999), available at http://www.culturekiosque.com/klassik/features/rhemenuhin_e.
html. The Author may not be completely objective here. One of the Author’s greatest privileges 
in life was to work closely with maestro Menuhin for two years on a copyright reform project 
in the 1990s. Should the reader want to experience the 1949 recording, part of it is available on 
Youtube,Brahms Violin concerto Cadenza Menuhin – Furtwangler 1949, YඈඎTඎൻൾ, https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=v6e5P1RvZOI. 
12.  J.A.L. Sඍൾඋඅංඇ඀, Iඇඍൾඅඅൾർඍඎൺඅ ඉඋඈඉൾඋඍඒ Rං඀ඁඍඌ ංඇ Sඈඎඇൽ Rൾർඈඋൽංඇ඀ඌ, Fංඅආ ൺඇൽ Vංൽൾඈ: 
Pඋඈඍൾർඍංඈඇ ඈൿ Pඁඈඇඈ඀උൺඉඁංඌ ൺඇൽ Cංඇൾආൺඍඈ඀උൺඉඁංർ Rൾർඈඋൽංඇ඀ඌ ൺඇൽ Wඈඋ඄ඌ ංඇ Nൺඍංඈඇൺඅ ൺඇൽ Iඇඍൾඋ-
ඇൺඍංඈඇൺඅ Lൺඐ 324 (1992)
13.  Id. 
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knot.”14 
This sounds like opting for a separate category of rights and excluding performers from 
copyright might decide the issue from a policy angle but again, it does not. Far from it. For 
one thing, in copyright, “proper” copyright protection is granted to authors of original pho-
tographs, though there is no formally agreed criterion to define originality in this context.15 
Some more “technical” photography (where there is little if any room to make a creative 
contribution) might thus be excluded.16 Indeed, a number of countries provide separate pro-
tection for nonoriginal photographs.17 It is, in other words, a complicated matter. Let us dive 
a little deeper into the matter.
B. The Emergence of Neighboring Rights and the Rome Convention
From an international perspective, the debate about whether performances can also be 
copyrighted works seems a bit surreal nowadays because performers’ rights are protected as 
related or neighboring rights, that is, rights related to, or neighboring on, copyright proper. 18 
Where does this spate protection of performers come from?
The protection of performers was discussed during much of the twentieth century.19 Efforts 
14.  See id.
15.  See Sam Ricketson, International Conventions, in Cඈඉඒඋං඀ඁඍ ൺඇൽ Pඁඈඍඈ඀උൺඉඁඌ: Aඇ Iඇඍൾඋඇൺ-
ඍංඈඇൺඅ Sඎඋඏൾඒ 15, 24 (Ysolde Gendreau et al., eds., 1999).
16.  See, e.g., Oriental Art Printing, Inc. v. Goldstar Printing Corp., 175 F. Supp. 2d 542 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001) in which the court held that pictures of Chinese food dishes taken for a menu lacked sufficient 
artistic quality to be copyrightable. The originality bar even of pictures of preexisting art is set quite 
low. See FragranceNet.com, Inc. v. FragranceX.com, Inc. 679 F. Supp. 2d 312 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
Judge Kaplan discussed the issue at length in a comparative (UK/US) perspective in Bridgeman Art 
Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp. 25 F. Supp. 2d 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
17.  For example in the Nordic countries, “’simple’ photographs, which are photographic products 
that do not meet the originality criterion, have a shorter and lesser protection than artistic works.” 
Rainer Oesch, Nordic Countries, in Cඈඉඒඋං඀ඁඍ ൺඇൽ Pඁඈඍඈ඀උൺඉඁඌ: Aඇ Iඇඍൾඋඇൺඍංඈඇൺඅ Sඎඋඏൾඒ 231, 
262 (Ysolde Gendreau et al., eds., 1999).  The same is true under section 72 of the German Copy-
right Act. See Axel Nordemann, Germany, in Cඈඉඒඋං඀ඁඍ ൺඇൽ Pඁඈඍඈ඀උൺඉඁඌ: Aඇ Iඇඍൾඋඇൺඍංඈඇൺඅ Sඎඋ-
ඏൾඒ 135, 140 (Ysolde Gendreau et al., eds., 1999). 
18.  The expression “neighboring rights” is commonly used to refer to rights “granted by the 
Rome Convention to performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasting organizations.” Wඈඋඅൽ 
ංඇඍൾඅඅൾർඍඎൺඅ Pඋඈඉൾඋඍඒ Oඋ඀ൺඇංඓൺඍංඈඇ, Gඎංൽൾ ඍඈ ඍඁൾ Rඈආൾ Cඈඇඏൾඇඍංඈඇ ൺඇൽ ඍඁൾ Pඁඈඇඈ඀උൺආඌ Cඈඇ-
ඏൾඇඍංඈඇ 7 (1981) [hereinafter Gඎංൽൾ]. Reference is made here to the International Convention for 
the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations, Oct. 26, 
1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43, available at http:// www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/rome/pdf/trtdocs_wo024.pdf 
[hereinafter Rome Convention]. The expression related rights is used by the European Union and the 
World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations (The Uruguay Round), 33 I.L.M. 81, art. 13 (December 15, 1993),available at http://
www.wto.int/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
19.  Gඎංൽൾ, supra note 19, at 7.
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to protect at least some performances were initially supported by the same organization that 
drafted the main international copyright treaty, namely the Berne Convention. 20 The origi-
nal text of that Convention (September 1886) was updated by the adoption of a protocol or 
revised several times, namely in Paris (1896), Berlin (1908), Rome (1928), Brussels (1948), 
and Stockholm (1967).21 An Appendix for developing countries was added to the Stockholm 
text, and the combination is now referred to as the “Paris Act” of the Berne Convention.22 It 
is at the 1948 conference in Brussels that it almost happened. As professors Ricketson and 
Ginsburg explain, in 1939, the International Office23 had prepared draft provisions “con-
nected with” the Berne Convention that would have protected performers.24 
The document was discussed but the outbreak of World War II, which led to the post-
ponement of the revision conference (eventually held in 1948), also meant that the issue of 
performers’ rights had to be set aside at that conference because Berne member countries, 
“many of whom had been on opposite sides during the recent war,” had diverging views on 
the matter.25 
Performers did not abandon their quest. A new coalition was formed. It created a role not 
just for BIRPI/WIPO as in previous discussions but also for UNESCO, a new organization 
at the time created (with the United Nations) after World War II. UNESCO was active early 
on in copyright circles with the adoption of the Universal Copyright Convention in 1952, 
with support from the United States. 26 Perhaps more importantly, the International Labor 
Office (ILO), which was “concerned with the interests of performers, as the victims of tech-
20.  Id. (“ [T]he international Literary and Artistic Association (ALAI) at its Congress in Wei-
mar in 1903 looked sympathetically at the light of solo performers.”) Reference is made here to the 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886; revised July 24, 
1971 and amended 1979; entered into force for United States Mar. 1, 1989 (Sen. Treaty Doc. 99-27)) 
1 B.D.I.E.L. 715 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. On the role of ALAI as drafter of the original text 
of the Berne Convention, see Sൺආ Rංർ඄ൾඍඌඈඇ ൺඇൽ Jൺඇൾ C. Gංඇඌൻඎඋ඀, I Iඇඍൾඋඇൺඍංඈඇൺඅ Cඈඉඒඋං඀ඁඍ ൺඇൽ 
Nൾං඀ඁൻඈඎඋංඇ඀ Rං඀ඁඍඌ: Tඁൾ Bൾඋඇൾ Cඈඇඏൾඇඍංඈඇ ൺඇൽ Bൾඒඈඇൽ 49-58 (Oxford University Press, Inc. 
2006) (1987). 
21.  An English version of all records of all those diplomatic conferences is available in WIPO, 
1886-1986: Bൾඋඇൾ Cඈඇඏൾඇඍංඈඇ Cൾඇඍൾඇൺඋඒ 136-219 (1897).  
22.  Id. 220-23. See also Rංർ඄ൾඍඌඈඇ ൺඇൽ Gංඇඌൻඎඋ඀, supra note 20, at 131-32.
23.  That is, the Bureaux Internationaux Réunis pour la Protection the la Propriété Intellectuelle 
(BIRPI), the predecessor of WIPO. See WIPO, 1967-1992: Tඁൾ Fංඋඌඍ Tඐൾඇඍඒ Fංඏൾ Yൾൺඋඌ ඈൿ ඍඁൾ 
Wඈඋඅൽ Iඇඍൾඅඅൾർඍඎൺඅ Pඋඈඉൾඋඍඒ Oඋ඀ൺඇංඓൺඍංඈඇ 21-28 (1992).
24.  Rංർ඄ൾඍඌඈඇ ൺඇൽ Gංඇඌൻඎඋ඀, supra note 21, at 1210.
25.  Id. 
26.  Universal Copyright Convention of September 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, T.I.A.S. 3324, 216 
U.N.T.S. 132, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971. It came into force with respect to the United 
States on September 16, 1955. See Copyright Office, Circular 38a: International Copyright Rela-
tions of the United States, U.S. Cඈඉඒඋං඀ඁඍ Oൿൿංർൾ May 1999, at 2, available at http://www.copyright.
gov/circs/circ38a.pdf. For a discussion, see Yale Law Journal, International Copyright Protection 
and the United States: The Impact of the UNESCO Universal Copyright Convention on Existing 
Law 62 Yൺඅൾ L. J. 1065 (1953).
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nological unemployment” due in large part to the invention of recording techniques, joined 
the debate.27 This meant that the status of performers was considered not only as “creators” 
but also, and perhaps first, as employees. 
A view held by many (mostly European) negotiators at the time was that at least some 
music performances could be considered “works” in their own right, but many also felt that 
parsing those worthy of “work” (i.e., full copyright) status from more “mechanical” perfor-
mances (that is, not exhibiting sufficient “originality”), combined with strong pressure from 
certain associations of composers, doomed the case for recognition of full copyright for 
performers. 
A first draft convention protecting the rights of performers separately from authors, and 
also those of sound recording producers and broadcasting organizations, was produced for 
a meeting in Rome in 195128. The ILO convened a separate meeting in Geneva in 1956 to 
draw up “detailed rules for the protection of performers.”29 UNESCO and BIRPI organized 
a parallel meeting in Monaco a year later, which produced a different draft text.30 The Ge-
neva and Monaco drafts were combined and modified at The Hague in 1960.31 A text was 
finally adopted in Rome in October 1961.32
Without purporting to summarize the Rome Convention, it is worth noting that it protects 
performers’ rights for a minimum period of 20 years computed from the end of the year in 
which fixation occurs or the performance took place.33 Article 7 of the Convention provides 
performers with inter alia protection against unauthorized fixation of their performance 
and against the reproduction of such unauthorized fixations.34 Also worth noting, while the 
Convention defines performers in a way that would protect not just music performers but 
also actors,35 once a performer consents to incorporation of his performance into a visual or 
audiovisual fixation, then Article 7 has no further application. 36
Linguistically, the fact that not all performances are equal is quite visible in the text 
of the Convention itself. While the English version of the Rome Convention refers to 
“performers,”37 the French and Spanish version use two words to distinguish two categories 
27.  Rංർ඄ൾඍඌඈඇ ൺඇൽ Gංඇඌൻඎඋ඀, supra note 21, at  1211.
28.  Id.
29.  Gඎංൽൾ, supra note 18, at 9.
30.  See id.
31.  See id.
32.  Rංർ඄ൾඍඌඈඇ ൺඇൽ Gංඇඌൻඎඋ඀, supra note 21, at  1211. See also Gඎංൽൾ, supra note 19, at 9.
33.  Rome Convention, supra note 19, art. 14.
34.  Id. art. 7(1).
35.  Id. art. 3(a) (“’[P]erformers’ means actors, singers, musicians, dancers, and other persons 
who act, sing, deliver, declaim, play in, or otherwise perform literary or artistic works.”)
36.  Id. art. 19 (“Notwithstanding anything in this Convention, once a performer has consented 
to the incorporation of his performance in a visual or audio–visual fixation, Article 7 shall have no 
further application.”)
37.  See Rome Convention, supra note 18.
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of performers. In French, the terms are interprètes and exécutants; in Spanish, interpretes 
and ejecutantes. This terminological distinction suggests that some performances are so tied 
to the underlying musical work that the performer merely “executes” them, almost in the 
way that a computer executes a program. Short of making mistakes, two equally skilled and 
competent performers should thus produce “executions” with little if any room to express 
their creativity. Other performances, however, put a personal touch and clearly add to the 
music as written, as in the Menuhin example above.38 
The laws of certain countries did incorporate that very distinction. As the Argentinean del-
egate to the Conference that adopted the 1961 Rome Convention explained:
Argentine law […] protects interpretes (interpretative artistes) –without refer-
ring to ejecutantes (executant artistes)—had led to certain judicial decisions 
from the benefi t of which executant artistes proper were in general excluded. 39
The distinction matters, because some performances, the distinction implies, may not rise 
to the level of originality required, but that may not be a valid reason to dismiss copyright 
protection of all performances. As Professors Ricketson and Ginsburg explain, the argument 
that performers (and in deed sound engineers, a matter to which this Essay returns below) 
use “technical skills” is no excuse to deny full copyright protection to at least certain per-
formances.40 After all, “the inclusion of photographs and cinematographic films within the 
scope of the Berne Convention undermines an argument that tries to distinguish the kind of 
skill applied in the creation of these various works.”41 Indeed, “[t]he truth is that there is no 
logical reason, based on the need for literary or artistic creation, why [performers] should 
not be protected under the Berne Convention.”42 The Guide to the Rome Convention goes 
a step further, in declaring that “performances of artistes are of their nature acts of spiritual 
creation.”43
The ILO view that that recording techniques might make the work of performers less 
frequently necessary and thus lead to employment issues can, in fact, be seen as a positive 
development for performers’ rights. As the three intergovernmental organizations respon-
sible for the administration of the Rome Convention noted:
Up to the end of the last [19th] century, the artistes’ off erings (actors in a play, 
operatic and concert singers, musicians playing pieces of music, circus and 
variety artistes doing their turns, etc.) had an ephemeral character. […]The in-
38.  See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
39.  ILO, UNESCO, & BIRPI, Rൾർඈඋൽඌ ඈൿ ඍඁൾ Dංඉඅඈආൺඍංർ Cඈඇൿൾඋൾඇർൾ ඈඇ ඍඁൾ Iඇඍൾඋඇൺඍංඈඇൺඅ 
ඉඋඈඍൾർඍංඈඇ ඈൿ Pൾඋൿඈඋආൾඋඌ, Pඋඈൽඎർൾඋඌ ඈൿ Pඁඈඇඈ඀උൺආඌ ൺඇൽ Bඋඈൺൽർൺඌඍංඇ඀ Oඋ඀ൺඇංඓൺඍංඈඇඌ 77 (1968) 
[hereinafter Rൾർඈඋൽඌ].
40.  Rංർ඄ൾඍඌඈඇ ൺඇൽ Gංඇඌൻඎඋ඀, supra note 21, at 1206.
41.  Id. 
42.  Id. at 1206-07.
43.  Gඎංൽൾ, supra note 18, at 12.
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vention of the gramophone, cinematography and radio, and their spread to an 
ever-wider public at the beginning of the 20th century, revolutionized the ways 
in which authors were able to publicize their work.44 
Recording techniques allowed performances the possibility of fixation, and hence, a rela-
tive degree of permanency. In this, they joined songwriters and composers who had long 
enjoyed the ability to use paper and pen to fix their work. 
Still, in the end, performers were moved to the Rome Convention “hotch-potch” of norms, 
together with two other categories of right holders, namely sound recording (phonogram) 
makers and broadcasting organizations. 45 This arguably demotes performers vis-a-vis au-
thors, but also puts them all on the same footing in determining whether their contribution is 
original or not.46
C. Rome and Beyond
In part because the United States had issues with rights being recognized for perform-
ers and broadcasters, a separate convention, the Phonograms (or Geneva) Convention of 
1971, was signed 10 years later.47 This convention only protects the rights of the makers of 
a sound recording. The United States joined in 1974–after the introduction of sound record-
ings protection under federal copyright law.48 The United States never joined Rome.49 
Since 1961, three major instruments have been adopted that affect the protection of per-
formers. First, the TRIPS Agreement provides that in respect to a fixation of their perfor-
mance on a phonogram, 
performers shall have the possibility of preventing the following acts when 
undertaken without their authorization: the fi xation of their unfi xed perfor-
44.  Id. at 9.
45.  The expression is used in id. at 12.
46.  Much has been said in this context about Article 1 of the Rome Convention, which provides 
that “[p]rotection granted under this Convention shall leave intact and shall in no way affect the 
protection of copyright in literary and artistic works. Consequently, no provision of this Convention 
may be interpreted as prejudicing such protection.” Rome Convention, supra note 19, art. 1.Whether 
that Article actually establishes a hierarchy of norms between copyright and related rights is highly 
debatable but there is no room to fully explore the issue here.
47.  Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplica-
tion of Phonograms (Geneva), Oct. 29, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 309 (1971). It took effect in the United 
States on March 10, 1974.
48.  Congress extended federal copyright protection to sound recordings on February 15, 1972. 
See Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 211 n. 4 (1985)..
49. On the problems that the United States had with the protection of performers under a “neigh-
boring rights” regime, see 3 Nංආආൾඋ ඈඇ Cඈඉඒඋං඀ඁඍ, § 8E.01[A]. There have been many calls for the 
United States to join Rome. See e.g., Bonnie Teller, Note, Toward Better Protection of Performers in 
the United States: A Comparative Look at Performers’ Rights in the United States, Under the Rome 
Convention And in France, 28 Cඈඅඎආ. J. Tඋൺඇඌඇൺඍ’අ L. 775 (1990). 
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mance and the reproduction of such fi xation. Performers shall also have the 
possibility of preventing the following acts when undertaken without their 
authorization: the broadcasting by wireless means and the communication to 
the public of their live performance.50 
This requires WTO members to adopt an anti-bootlegging provision, and one was indeed 
incorporated into US law when the United States joined the WTO in 1995. 51
With a second new instrument added to the mix, namely the 1996 WIPO Performances 
and Phonograms Treaty, performers now have most of the rights that authors enjoy under 
Berne, including a moral right, at least for countries party to the WPPT. 52 The WPPT singles 
out two of the three Rome categories (performers and record producers). A possible treaty 
on the third Rome category (broadcasters) is currently under consideration at WIPO.53
The third and last post-Rome instrument is the much more recent Beijing Treaty. 54 It pro-
vides a series of rights specifically for audiovisual performers (actors) who were abandoned 
by Rome once they had consented to a fixation of their performance.55 The performers’ 
rights contained in the Beijing Treaty include a right to authorize the fixation of direct and 
indirect reproduction of their performances.56 The Treaty also provides, however, that a 
Contracting Party may provide in its national law that once a performer has 
consented to fi xation of his or her performance in an audiovisual fi xation, the 
exclusive rights of authorization provided for in Articles 7 to 11 of this Treaty 
50.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 18, art 14.1.
51.  Uruguay Round Agreements Act,  § 4809, 108 Stat. at 4973-81 (1994) (Pub. L. No. 103-465, 
§ 314). The provision is contained in 17 U.S.C. § 1101(c) (1994). For a discussion, see 3 Nංආආൾඋ ඈඇ 
Cඈඉඒඋං඀ඁඍ, § 8E.02 and § 8E.03[C][1]. See also Mൺඋඌඁൺඅඅ A. Lൾൺൿൿൾඋ, Uඇൽൾඋඌඍൺඇൽංඇ඀ Cඈඉඒඋං඀ඁඍ 
Lൺඐ § 12.04[A], at 375-76 and n.20 (2d ed. 1995).
52.  WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, 36 I.L.M. 76 (Geneva, 1997) (S. Treaty Doc. 
No. 05-17) [hereinafter WPPT]. Art. 5 of the WPPT provides that “[i]ndependently of a performer’s 
economic rights, and even after the transfer of those rights, the performer shall, as regards his live 
aural performances or performances fixed in phonograms, have the right to claim to be identified as 
the performer of his performances, except where omission is dictated by the manner of the use of the 
performance, and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of his performances 
that would be prejudicial to his reputation.”) This language can be compared to Art. 6(b) of the 
Berne Convention, which provides a moral right for authors. 93 countries were party to the WPPT 
as of August 2014. See WIPO, Contracting Parties > WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, 
available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=20. 
53.  See WIPO, Broadcasting Organizations, available at http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/ac-
tivities/broadcast.html 
54.  WIPO, Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances,  June 24, 2012,  available at http://
www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=295837 [hereinafter Beijing Treaty]. For a discussion, see 
David Lange, From Berne to Beijing: A Critical Perspective, 16 Vൺඇൽ. J. Eඇඍ. & Tൾർඁ. L. 1 (2013). 
55.  See supra note 36.
56.  Beijing Treaty, supra note 55, arts. 6 and 7.
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shall be owned or exercised by or transferred to the producer.”57
III. Rൾඅൺඍൾൽ Rං඀ඁඍඌ ංඇ ඍඁൾ Uඇංඍൾൽ Sඍൺඍൾඌ
The difficulty in squeezing the United States in a related rights regime is not hard to under-
stand historically. The reasons not to adopt such a regime today do appear less convincing 
than they once were, however. Let us examine the usual objections and critiques. 
A. Common Law Jurisdictions and Related Rights
The Rome Convention has not historically been particularly friendly to common law juris-
dictions. Indeed, as WIPO itself has noted:
The number of countries party to the Rome Convention has grown slowly. 
One of the main reasons for the limited adherence was the fact that countries 
following a common law tradition were not interested in acceding to the Con-
vention since they were of the view that phonograms and broadcasts were 
already eligible for copyright protection.58
The historical record supports this view. The Convention was adopted in 1961. Yet the fol-
lowing table shows that common law jurisdictions were late to join:
Country Date of Accession
Australia June 30, 1992
Canada March 4, 1998
Jamaica October 27, 1993
Nigeria July 29, 1993
United Kingdom October 30, 1963
Date of Accession59
Not just the United States but other relatively important common law jurisdictions such as 
New Zealand and South Africa are not party to the Convention.60
The exception to the rule seems to be the United Kingdom which, as the above table 
shows, joined early on in 1964. History reveals here again, however, the difficulty at hand. 
57. Id. art. 12(1). 
58. WIPO, Gඎංൽൾ ඍඈ ඍඁൾ Cඈඉඒඋං඀ඁඍ ൺඇൽ Rൾඅൺඍൾൽ Rං඀ඁඍඌ Tඋൾൺඍංൾඌ Aൽආංඇංඌඍൾඋൾൽ ൻඒ WIPO 8 
(2003).
59. See id. (WIPO, Contracting Parties > Rome Convention, available at http://www.wipo.int/
treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=17. The treaty enters into force three months after 
accession.)
60.  See id. 
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The United Kingdom negotiated not to introduce performers’ rights as separate from copy-
right and protected performers against bootlegging under criminal law. This explains why 
both the Rome Convention and the TRIPS Agreement do not provide exclusive rights 
against unauthorized fixation of performances but rather only a “possibility of preventing” 
them. 61 The reticence is understandable because adopting a related rights regime may be 
seen as an admission that sound recordings and performances are not (necessarily) copy-
righted works. Yet, adaptation is possible as most common law jurisdictions now protect 
performers under a related rights regime.62 
Would adaptation by the United States be harder than joining Berne, which required aban-
doning mandatory formalities and introducing a (very limited) moral right?63 The United 
States has already ratified a treaty requiring moral rights for performers, and the Rome Con-
vention is more lax than Berne on the subject of formalities, as it allows for the imposition 
of a marking requirement, namely the ℗ notice. 64
B. The United States Position on the Rome Convention
The United States Copyright Act does not officially recognize a related rights category. 
Sound recordings are copyrighted works.65 In practice, however, there are three levels of 
copyright in the statute: (1) a full (Berne level) copyright for authors of certain works of the 
visual arts, which benefit from the rights in 17 U.S.C. §§ 106 and 106A; (2) a set of copy-
right rights which is more or less the equivalent of Berne economic rights for all works not 
affected by section 106A and other than sound recordings;66 and (3) a “related right-like” 
61.  Rome Convention, supra note 19, art. 7(1); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 14.1. This 
was recognized in the Rൾർඈඋൽඌ, supra note 39, at 43 (“[I]t was understood that tis expression was 
used in order to allow counties like the United Kingdom to continue to protect performers by virtue 
of criminal statutes.”).
62.  To take an example from a jurisdiction mentioned in the table, in Australia, see Copyright 
Act 1968 , ss 89-92 (Austl.), which protects rights in sound recordings as “subject-matter, other than 
works, in which copyright subsists” (emphasis added).
63.  See Jane C. Ginsburg & John M. Kernochan, One Hundred and Two Years Later: The U.S. 
Joins the Berne Convention, 13 Cඈඅඎආ.-VLA J. L. & Aඋඍඌ 1, 2-8 and 15-16 (1988). 
64.  On moral rights in the WPPT, see WPPT, supra note 52. On formalities, see Rome Conven-
tion, supra note 19, art. 11 (which provides in part “[i]f, as a condition of protecting the rights of 
producers of phonograms, or of performers, or both, in relation to phonograms, a Contracting State, 
under its domestic law, requires compliance with formalities, these shall be considered as fulfilled if 
all the copies in commerce of the published phonogram or their containers bear a notice consisting 
of the symbol ℗, accompanied by the year date of the first publication, placed in such a manner as 
to give reasonable notice of claim of protection.”)
65.  Under 17 U.S.C. § 101, “sound recordings” are works that result from the fixation of a series 
of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or 
other audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or other 
phonorecords, in which they are embodied. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) defines “works of authorship:” as 
including sound recordings. 
66.  17 U.S.C. § 106A was added by § 5089 of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 104 Stat. at 
5128 (Pub. L. No. 101-650).
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right for sound recordings with some of the section 106 rights (that is, excluding public 
performance), defining the reproduction right specifically for sound recordings in section 
114(b) and adding the right in digital audio transmissions.67
Performances are not protected as works. Performers are mentioned twice in the Copy-
right Act, namely as holders of the anti-bootlegging right added in implementing the TRIPS 
Agreement,68 and in the right to receive a set percentage of the monies collected by the col-
lective designated to operate the digital audio transmission compulsory license (for certain 
non-interactive transmissions), namely SoundExchange, Inc.69 The unauthorized fixation of 
performances may have been captured not under copyright but under the right of publicity, 
at least in certain states.70 
Then there are a number of constitutional law issues that this Essay will not address, 
including whether the anti-bootlegging statute is in fact validly adopted under the Copy-
right and Patent Clause.71 For our purposes, what matters is that performers have no spate 
statutory right under US copyright law except in the anti-bootlegging context. Audiovisual 
performers are in a more difficult situation because the work-for-hire doctrine applies to 
them.72 
A final note on the Rome Convention’s impact in the United States. Failure of the United 
States to adhere has cost US performers and industry tens of millions of dollars in remu-
67.  17 U.S.C. § 106 provides exclusive rights in sound recordings, including a digital audio 
transmission right, but not a full public performance right due to the exclusion of sound recordings 
in section 106(4). Under 17 U.S.C. § 114(b), sound recording copyright holders’ exclusive rights 
are defined as including: (1) the right to duplicate the sound recording in the form of phonorecords 
or copies that directly or indirectly recapture the actual sounds fixed in the recording; (2) the right 
to prepare a derivative work in which the actual sounds fixed in the sound recording are rearranged, 
remixed, or otherwise altered in sequence or quality; and (3) the right to distribute copies or pho-
norecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, 
lease, or lending.
68.  See supra note 51 ** 61 **.
69.  SoundExchange administers the performer and producer rights in noninteractive digital trans-
missions of sound recordings under a compulsory license (17 U.S.C. § 114(e)(1) (2006).) and rates 
fixed by royalty judges, a system administered by the Copyright Office of the United States with an 
exemption from antitrust rules. For a discussion, see Daniel Gervais, The Landscape of Collective 
Management Schemes, 34 Cඈඅඎආ. J. L & Aඋඍඌ 591, 597 and 608 (2011).
70.  Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (applying the Ohio right 
of publicity).
71.  The fact that the protection applies to unfixed performances and is not limited in time led one 
court to question its validity. See United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
at 424-25; vacated and remanded by 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007). The Second Circuit vacated and 
remanded, finding the anti-bootlegging provision validly adopted under the Commerce Clause. The 
Eleventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the provision in United States v. Moghadam, 175 
F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999).
72.  Apparently even professional athletes can be considered workers-for-hire in that context. See 
Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Assoc. 805 F.2d 663, 670 (7th Cir. 1986).
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neration paid for the broadcasting of sound recordings that are not paid to United States 
rights holders because the Rome Convention and TRIPS allow reciprocity in this regard as 
opposed to the usual standard of nondiscrimination against foreign nationals known as na-
tional treatment. 73 To obtain the remuneration from Rome Convention members, the United 
States would have to ratify the Convention and establish a remuneration for the broadcast-
ing of sound recordings. Many bills have been tabled in Congress, but opposition is fierce.74
C. Originality of Performances in the United States
1. Sound recordings
Is the US statute stuck in its own contradiction(s) here? Treating a sound recording or a 
movie as a full copyrighted work means that it must be original.75 In the case of a sound 
recording, originality can follow from the studio engineer’s work, the producer’s input 
and from the performance (of the main performers and possibly also the background 
performers).76 That seems, to the Author at least, as an exhaustive list. The producer may 
be there mostly on a financial level, but some producers do make suggestions that pass the 
originality threshold.77 In discussing one of the highest grossing albums of all time, Michael 
Jackson’s Thriller, Mark Jaffe noted:
Anyone who purchased the album would associate Thriller with Jackson, the 
star attraction with the distinctive vocals. But the album was produced by a 
superstar in his own right, Quincy Jones . . . [who] supervised the recording 
session, vocal arrangements, rhythm arrangements, and musicians.78
A producer may make “suggestions”; general suggestions face a copyrightability or perhaps 
more precisely an authorship policy issue, however.79 One could argue that the producer is 
73.  Rome Convention, supra note 19, art. 16(1)(a). See Emery Simon, GATT and NAFTA Provi-
sions on Intellectual Property, 4 Fඈඋൽඁൺආ Iඇඍൾඅඅ. Pඋඈඉ. Mൾൽංൺ & Eඇඍ. L.J. 267, 278 (1993) .
74.  See William Henslee, What’s Wrong With U.S.?: Why The United States Should Have a Pub-
lic Performance Right for Sound Recordings, 13 Vൺඇൽ. J. Eඇඍ. & Tൾർඁ. L. 739, 749 (2011) (“Since 
the 1995 Sound Recording Act, both the 110th and 111th Congresses have introduced the Perfor-
mance Rights Act, which would grant a royalty for all performances of sound recordings. Both 
attempts failed to make it to the House and Senate floors for a vote after passing in Committee.” 
(Notes omitted)).
75.  See supra notes 3 and 4 and accompanying text.
76.  See Mark H. Jaffe, Note, Defusing the Time Bomb Once Again – Determining Authorship in 
a Sound Recording, 53 J. Cඈඉඒඋං඀ඁඍ Sඈർ’ඒ U.S.A. 139 (2006); and Phil Hill, Note, Fix it in the Mix: 
Disaggregating the Record Producer’s Copyright, 26 Hൺඋඏ. J.L. & Tൾർඁ. 325 (2012). 
77.  ***___________________***
78.  Jaffe, supra note 77, at 601-02.
79.  See Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1235 (9th Cir 2000) (“What Aalmuhammed’s 
evidence showed, and all it showed, was that, subject to Spike Lee’s authority to accept them, he 
made very valuable contributions to the movie. That is not enough for co-authorship of a joint work. 
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not unlike the maker of a collective work such as a periodical, where authorship belongs to 
the “organizer.” The statute defines collective works as works, “such as a periodical issue, 
anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and 
independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole.”80 One would have 
to see each contribution to the recording (performances, sound engineer, etc., as indepen-
dent works).
Another version sees sound recordings as compilations, namely when the contribution is 
made to an album, which would then likely exclude singles. 81 It also seems that the compila-
tion of tracks by a single artist does not fit the policy purpose of “compilations.” Indeed, the 
word “compilation” is used in music often to describe an album with (typically pre-existing) 
recordings from several different sources.82 As an alternative to this second version, it has 
been argued that the individual songs are works specially ordered or commissioned by the 
record company.83 The industry may have had some doubts about this theory because in 
1999 it convinced Congress to add sound recordings to the list of works that can be made-
for-hire.84 This caused an uproar and Congress withdrew the provision less than a year 
later.85 
The Constitution establishes the social policy that our construction of the statutory term ‘authors’ 
carries out. The Founding Fathers gave Congress the power to give authors copyrights in order ‘[t]o 
promote the progress of Science and useful arts.’ Progress would be retarded rather than promoted, 
if an author could not consult with others and adopt their useful suggestions without sacrificing sole 
ownership of the work.”)
80.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). 
81.  17 U.S.C. § 101 defines compilations as works “formed by the collection and assembling 
of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the 
resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.” The statute adds that the term 
“compilation” includes collective works. See Jessica Johnson, Note, Application of the Copyright 
Termination Provision to the Music Industry: Sound Recordings Should Constitute Works Made 
for Hire, 67 U. Mංൺආං L. Rൾඏ. 661, 673-74 (2013) (“[I]n cases where an artist is contracted for the 
completion of a ‘single’, this intent to use the recording in a collective work is not present, destroy-
ing the argument. Even if the single were to end up in an album later in time, the fact that it was not 
initially recorded with that purpose in mind causes it to fall outside of the statutory definition.”)
82.  For example the album “20 Greatest Hits 1963 Original Artists,” described by the court in 
Kings Records, Inc. v. Bennett, 438 F. Supp. 2d 812 (M.D.Tenn. 2006). This seems to be supported 
by the Copyright office, which, in the instructions on the registration of sound recordings, notes the 
following: “If the claim extends only to the compilation of preexisting sound recordings, give the 
year in which the compilation was fixed.” Copyright Office, Circular 56: Copyright Registration for 
Sound Recordings, U.S. Cඈඉඒඋං඀ඁඍ Oൿൿංർൾ at 3 (2014), available at http://copyright.gov/circs/circ56.
pdf (emphasis added). 
83.  See Johnson, supra note 81, at 674-76.
84.  See Entertainment Law Reporter, Congress Repeals 1999 Copyright Act Amendment Making 
Sound Recordings Eligible to be Classified as “Works Made for Hire”; Pre-Amendment Status Quo 
Is Restored, Without Prejudice to Prior Positions of Recording Artists or Record Companies, 22 No. 
6 Eඇඍ. L. Rൾඉ. 8 (2000). 
85.  Work Made for Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000, H.R. 5107, 106th Cong. (2d 
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Either version of that theory would allow sound recordings to be considered as works 
made-for-hire.86 That interpretation of the statute is, not surprisingly, supported by a num-
ber of players in the recording industry.87 Some commentators see the simple fact of the 
1999 amendment as an admission, however, or at least an interpretive direction, that sound 
recordings are not works made-for-hire despite the careful congressional language of the 
repeal. 88 Be that as it may, the need for originality for all copyrighted works persists. 
Sound engineers are highly skilled. Their work is important. Is it copyrightable? There 
are three types of contributions to be considered.89 The recording engineer is responsible 
for the actual recording session, where he captures the artist’s performances. This process 
involves selecting and placing the microphones correctly. This type of technical work is not 
likely to make a creative contribution. The mix engineer is responsible for compiling the 
recorded sound into a final product. This involves adjusting volume levels, creating sound 
effects, etc. Finally, the mastering engineer is responsible for perfecting the sound and 
making minor improvements to the overall recording by making subtle frequency adjust-
ments and adding effects. The last two categories of engineers may well make “creative 
contributions.”90 
The industry seems to agree. The Recording Academy defines an engineer for the purposes 
of Grammy Award as a 
person is present in the recording studio or at the location recording and is 
responsible for the process of recording and/or mixing a project as well as 
technical issues and decisions. He or she operates (or oversees the operation 
of) the equipment during the recording process and makes creative and aes-
thetic choices in order to realize the sound and concepts the artist and producer 
envision.”91 
Sess. 2000).
86.  See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“work made for hire”) (“A ‘work made for hire’ is . . . a work specially 
ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work . . .”) (omissions added).
87.  See Jerome N. Epping, Jr., Comment, Harmonizing the United States and European Com-
munity Copyright Terms: Needed Adjustment or Money for Nothing?, 65 U. Cංඇ. L. Rൾඏ. 183, 198 
(1996).
88.  See Kathryn Starshak, It’s the End of the World as Musicians Know It, or Is It? Artists Battle 
the Record Industry and Congress to Restore Their Termination Rights in Sound Recordings, 51 
DൾPൺඎඅ L. Rൾඏ. 71 (2001).
89.  The Author is most grateful to Alandis Brassel (J.D. Vanderbilt, 2014), a sound engineer, for 
explaining the roles of the various engineers involved in the production of sound recordings. 
90.  See Dඈඇൺඅൽ S. Pൺඌඌආൺඇ, Aඅඅ Yඈඎ Nൾൾൽ Tඈ Kඇඈඐ Aൻඈඎඍ Tඁൾ Mඎඌංർ Bඎඌංඇൾඌඌ 131 (8th ed. 
2012) (“Closely akin to producers are mixers . . . [.] Basically, these folks take the multitracks and 
throw them into a blender to produce a mystical potion of sublime music. Great mixers can make a 
huge difference in the success of a record[.]”).
91.  Engineer: GRAMMY® Award Eligibility Crediting Definitions, at 2, available at http://www.
grammy.org/files/pages/Engineer_Definitions.pdf. 
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The industry practice does not consider engineers generally as authors. If they were, unless 
the work made for hire doctrine applied – which is doubtful in light of the analysis above – 
then the industry would face a significant difficulty because engineers rarely, if ever, sign 
copyright transfer agreements. 92
If performers and perhaps also sound engineers are authors, then they would be in a posi-
tion to obtain the reversion of any copyright transferred by contract (not work made for 
hire) 35 years after any transfer that occurred on or after January 1, 1978. 93 
2. Motion pictures
A motion picture is a mix of directing and acting and typically many other contributions, 
all on the basis of a screenplay. As the Ninth Circuit explained in Aalmuhammad, the list of 
contributors is long:
Who, in the absence of contract, can be considered an author of a movie? 
. . . [T]that might be the producer who raises the money. Eisenstein thought 
the author of a movie was the editor. The ‘auteur’ theory suggests that it might 
be the director, at least if the director is able to impose his artistic judgments 
on the fi lm. Traditionally, by analogy to books, the author was regarded as the 
person who writes the screenplay, but often a movie refl ects the work of many 
screenwriters. Grenier suggests that the person with creative control tends to 
be the person in whose name the money is raised, perhaps a star, perhaps the 
director, perhaps the producer, with control gravitating to the star as the fi nan-
cial investment in scenes already shot grows. Where the visual aspect of the 
movie is especially important, the chief cinematographer might be regarded as 
the author. And for, say, a Disney animated movie like “The Jungle Book,” it 
might perhaps be the animators and the composers of the music.94
In most cases, the many contributions are melded into a single work made for hire whole 
upon the execution of an agreement to that effect.95 This eliminates the determination of 
individual authorship. Contracts between the major studios and the Screen Actors Guild 
(SAG/AFTRA) and the Screenwriters Guild then apply to determine the sharing rules for 
certain uses of the film and the splits of receipts from foreign collective management orga-
92.  This is well described in the film Tඈආ Dඈඐൽ & Tඁൾ Lൺඇ඀ඎൺ඀ൾ Oൿ Mඎඌංർ (2003).
93.  See Starshak, supra note 88.
94.  Aalmuhammad v. Lee, 202 F.3d  at 1232-33 (omission added)
95.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (“work made for hire”) (“A ‘work made for hire’ is . . .  a work specially 
ordered or commissioned for use . . . as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work  . . . if 
the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered 
a work made for hire.”) (omissions added).
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nizations that collect private copying levies.96
A preexisting screenplay is an easy case: It is a discrete (literary) work.97 The case is harder 
for the direction and acting.98 In Garcia, the court was correct to say that the plaintiff’s 
performance exhibited the traits of a creative contribution. As with musical performance, 
there is indeed ample room for creativity in performing a screenplay for lead actors, even 
while following the director’s instructions. Whether the “extras” can then be compared to 
background singers—to the extent that their room for Feistian creative choices seems more 
limited strikes the Author as a valid question.
Whether an audiovisual performance is separately copyrightable in cases where it is not 
a work made for hire due to lack of consent is another matter. Under international law, the 
matter is simple enough: a performer must consent to the fixation under both the Rome 
Convention and under the Beijing Treaty.99 The impulse that informed the Garcia court—
and its underlying normative heftstrikes me as valid: requiring consent for the fixation to 
exhaust the performers’ rights. In other words, the Ninth Circuit’s intuition that (a) an actor 
should have rights where consent to fixation is in doubt and (b) that her contribution is “cre-
ative” are both correct. Unfortunately, because the only vehicle that seemed available under 
U.S. law is “copyright,” the court was more or less compelled to apply Feist and the notions 
96.  See Adriane Porcin, Of Guilds and Men: Copyright Workarounds in the Cinematographic In-
dustry 35 Hൺඌඍංඇ඀ඌ Cඈආආ. & Eඇඍ L.J. 1, 33-34 (2012) (describing the guild arrangements as ‘work-
arounds’ the European notion of authorship). 
97.  As the Garcia court also noted. See Garcia, 743 F.3d at 1264 (“A screenplay is itself a copy-
rightable creative work.”)
98.  The border is often unclear. Choreographies are protected by copyright (and named as such 
in 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(4)) but the border between unfixed choreographies and the performance is 
very fuzzy. Though this is for another article, my intuition is that the border can be drawn using 
the distinction between imitation and reproduction. I can reproduce a choreography while varying 
stylistically, as seems to have happened in the Anne Teresa De Keersmaeker v. Beyoncé example. 
See Judith Mackrell, Beyoncé, De Keersmaeker – And a Dance Reinvented by Everyone, Gඎൺඋൽංൺඇ, 
Oct. 9. 2013, available at http://www.theguardian.com/stage/2013/oct/09/beyonce-de-keersmaeker-
technology-dance. By contrast, one can imitate but not “reproduce” Clark Gable’s performance in 
Gone with the Wind. This is of course an issue that would need much more in depth treatment.
99.  See supra notes 36 and 54 and accompanying text. As of this writing (August 2014), as 
explained in Part II D above, it is unlikely that the United States will ratify Rome. Whether the 
Beijing Treaty will be ratified is unclear. See Hannibal Travis, WIPO and the American Constitution: 
Thoughts on a New Treaty Relating to Actors and Musicians, 16 Vൺඇൽ. J. Eඇඍ. & Tൾർඁ. L. 45 (2013) 
(arguing that changes to United States law required to comply with the treaty might violate the First 
Amendment and other aspects of the Bill of Rights).
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of derivative work,100 work made-for-hire,101 and joint work102 to the situation at hand. That 
is in large part why the outcome seems messy to a number of commentators. 
A related rights regime does not have to address those issues because performers have 
rights that are separate from the underlying copyright in the audiovisual production. As a 
result of the creation of related rights, most countries do not have a “Garcia issue”: they pro-
tect musical and audiovisual performances under a related right. For actors, this may include 
a loss of exclusive rights but as already noted only after consent to the incorporation of the 
performance in the audiovisual production (or some other arrangement meant to allow the 
producer to exploit the work).
Cඈඇർඅඎඌංඈඇ
A related rights approach is not a legal panacea. It would, however, have several advantag-
es. First, it would provide US performers with a right under the Rome Convention to obtain 
their share of foreign remuneration paid for the broadcasting of phonograms. Second, it 
would allow for the recognition of a “consent to fixation” right in audiovisual performances, 
subject to First Amendment scrutiny. The “horrific”103 situation of Garcia v. Google, in 
which completely understandable impulses informed the court’s conclusion, would not 
arise. Third, and perhaps most importantly, it would formally separate sound recordings 
from musical works and greatly simplify the issue of authorship in sound recordings, be-
cause the need for originality would be replaced by a series of well delineated, limited 
rights. As the reversion litigation over who is the author of sound recordings gets underway, 
Congress could and should ameliorate a difficult situation for industries already facing a 
challenging transition to a fully digital environment.
100.  Garcia, 743 F.3d at 1262-63 (“A film is typically conceived of as ‘a joint work consisting of 
a number of contributions by different ‘authors’,’” citing 1 Mൾඅඏංඅඅൾ B. Nංආආൾඋ & Dൺඏංൽ Nංආආൾඋ, 
Nංආආൾඋ ඈඇ Cඈඉඒඋං඀ඁඍ § 6.05 at 6–14 (1990).).
101.  Garcia, 743 F.3d at 1264 (“Where, as here, an actor’s performance is based on a script, the 
performance is likewise derivative of the script, such that the actor might be considered to have 
infringed the screenwriter’s copyright.”).
102.  Garcia, 743 F.3d at 1265 (“Under the work for hire doctrine, the rights to Garcia’s perfor-
mance vested in Youssef if Garcia was Youssef’s employee and acted in her employment capacity or 
was an independent contractor who transferred her interests in writing.”).
103.  See supra note 2. 
